Community trash as community income in Kathmandu: if waste were treated as a common pool resource through public-private partnerships

Basnyat, Ashma

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/95544 Copy

Description

Title

Community trash as community income in Kathmandu: if waste were treated as a common pool resource through public-private partnerships

Author(s)

Basnyat, Ashma

Issue Date

2016-09-06

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Doussard, Marc J

Department of Study

Urban & Regional Planning

Discipline

Urban Planning

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

M.U.P.

Degree Level

Thesis

Keyword(s)

public-private partnerships, solid waste management, Kathmandu, common pool resources

Abstract

This chapter focuses on revamping KMC’s SWM model to achieve two goals: local private sector involvement as a form of PPPs and community interaction. I propose a model that applies the 1999 Local Self Governance Act to enable communities to take charge of SWM in their locale by forming consumer groups that act as private sector partners to the local government. The local government’s responsibility in this case does not change dramatically from the current PPP structure where a private sector entity is hired to collect and transport solid waste to a solid waste dump. The only difference is that local administration will have to interact with community members as they form their consumer groups. Furthermore, I suggest that each ward, which is the lowest administrative level in a municipality, create their own consumer group. However, this does not prevent wards from working with one another to create larger consumer groups, i.e., private handlers. What this does mean though is that the municipal government will be contracting out to and interacting with multiple contractors for the same services that one contractor previously managed. While this may seem inefficient, it should be noted that the LSGA requires each ward to elect a ward committee consisting of a chairperson and members (LSGA, 1999: 2-6). Thus this committee would handle interactions with consumer groups rather than the central municipal office. This increased interaction with local government allows for community members and the local government to build a relationship of trust, especially since the LGSA does not allow consumer groups to keep the funds they earn. Instead, the local government would have to manage the proceeds. If a consumer group is to act like a private sector entity then logic dictates it should manage its income. However, since the consumer group is in fact working in partnership with the local government, it is not an imperative. Earlier discussions have already established that each nation should define its own terms for PPPs that best suite their needs. While there is indeed a national PPP Act the act can be viewed as guidelines rather than requirements, i.e., municipalities can define their own terms for PPPs. This is because the LSGA gives municipalities the freedom to make adjustments for local needs. In some respects this is a loophole or a fail safe for local governments as they are expected to adapt to changing local needs rather than the central government. The 2011 SWM Act also adapts to this jurisdiction division. It should also be noted that increased interaction is not limited to community members and the local government. This suggested model, which is an application of Elinor Ostrom’s Common Pool Resources, also increases interaction and interdependence among community members. The core idea in CPR is that some public goods are indeed subtractive. Said differently, if individuals follow their own self interest instead of working towards the common good, the resource can diminish reducing benefits for all (Ostrom, 1998). Thus, if a community works together to manage their solid waste by selling the waste then there is a mode of a community income. However, if community members do not contribute to this pool then the potential income not only decreases but community ties also suffer. This model then promotes neighbor interaction to monitor each household’s contribution. It also enables communication, which a key factor to CPR success, to ensure that all community members share a 'common value’ and voice their concerns (Ostrom, 1990).

Graduation Semester

2016-12

Type of Resource

text

Permalink

http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95544

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2016 Ashma Basnyat

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