This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/87916
Description
Title
Essays on Economic Aspects of Corruption
Author(s)
Arikan, Guzin Gulsun
Issue Date
2004
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Brueckner, Jan K.
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Political Science, Public Administration
Language
eng
Abstract
In the last part, an exercise which uses a natural resource extraction model to theoretically examine corrupt privatization is presented. Corrupt officials have been known to use their authority to manipulate the privatization process in return for private benefits. The optimal time path of privatization by corrupt officials is found and its consequences are discussed. Then the effects of decentralizing the privatization process are analyzed. The model indicates that decentralization decreases the total privatization time. Under a given condition, decentralization also decreases corruption and the total revenue, and increases consumer surplus.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
