Modeling the Bargaining Game Between Multinational Firms and Britain's Office of Fair Trading: An Exploratory Analysis
Kryda, Georgine Marie
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/87895
Description
Title
Modeling the Bargaining Game Between Multinational Firms and Britain's Office of Fair Trading: An Exploratory Analysis
Author(s)
Kryda, Georgine Marie
Issue Date
1997
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Hennart, Jean-Francois
Roehl, Thomas
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Commerce-Business
Language
eng
Abstract
Few cases actually reach the MMC. The expense and intrusiveness of inquiries for both the target firms and the government lead to expectations that bargaining is preferred. Case histories of OFT and MMC decisions are reconstructed in order to determine why a negotiated settlement was or was not reached early on. These case histories of specific mergers illustrate how either corporate or agency strategy can influence the decision to pursue a case through the entire regulatory framework.
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