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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/87594
Description
Title
Competence, Expertise, and Linguistic Communities
Author(s)
Neely, Erica Leigh
Issue Date
2005
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Ebbs, Gary
Department of Study
Philosophy
Discipline
Philosophy
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Language, Linguistics
Language
eng
Abstract
This difference in requirements for the two groups hinges upon a distinction between belief and attributed belief, or what one actually believes versus what one is thought to believe. I argue that expertise involves playing a social role and thus is not simply a matter of having many relevant beliefs on a subject; a speaker will not rely on an expert if he does not believe her to be one. This dependence on attributed belief sometimes results in a community's taking as experts people who perhaps should not be; although philosophers tend to gloss over problems caused by ignorant or deceptive experts, this is a mistake. I discuss a number of ways in which such experts can cause trouble for competent speakers; in extreme cases, the social structure may break down and the linguistic community fracture into disparate segments. Although it is not possible to ensure that reliance on experts will always function smoothly, I note some ways to improve our practice and point out directions for future work.
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