Empirical Essays on Auctions of Brazilian Treasury Securities
Silva, Anderson Caputo
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/87428
Description
Title
Empirical Essays on Auctions of Brazilian Treasury Securities
Author(s)
Silva, Anderson Caputo
Issue Date
2001
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Kahn, Charles M.
Department of Study
Finance
Discipline
Finance
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Finance
Language
eng
Abstract
Chapter 3 is motivated by the unusual institutional feature that in Brazil auctions of government securities are carried out by two different entities, the Central Bank (CB) and the National Treasury Secretariat (NTS). This chapter examines demand and profitability in the two sets of auctions and find that bidders pay a premium on securities in periods of interest rate volatility. We find that despite an apparent preference for CB instruments, there is no evidence of differences in profitability between auctions of the two institutions.
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