Simulations of Merger -Induced Price Changes in Hospital Markets
Kautter, John Michael, Jr
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Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/85675
Description
Title
Simulations of Merger -Induced Price Changes in Hospital Markets
Author(s)
Kautter, John Michael, Jr
Issue Date
2000
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Cory S. Capps
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Health Sciences, Health Care Management
Language
eng
Abstract
The remainder of this dissertation models the effects of increasing managed care penetration on the incentive for hospitals to merge. The typical hospital market is modeled as a logit oligopoly. An implication of the model is that the incentive for hospitals to merge rises as the managed care penetration in their market increases.
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