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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/85640
Description
Title
Essays in Economics Under Uncertainty
Author(s)
Serfes, Konstantinos
Issue Date
1998
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Commerce-Business
Language
eng
Abstract
In the first chapter, we study the process of learningin a differential information economy. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically, i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. In particular, we examine the following two questions: (1) If we have a sequence of allocations that are in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy? (2) Given a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation? In the second chapter we address similar questions as in the first one in a differential information game by employing the Bayesian-Nash as the equilibrium concept. In the third chapter, we examine a Cournot game with differential private information. We study collusion under different information rules, i.e., when firms pool their private information, use their common knowledge information, or decide not to share their private information at all. We put the industry profits under the three different information schemes in a hierarchy and we look at the incentive compatibility problem Finally, we deal with the issue of how the industry profits are distributed among the firms, in a way that asymmetries are captured. In the fourth chapter, we consider an industry where firms can choose their product's price and quality. We examine the profitability of two different cartel organizational forms: Semicollusion, where firms collude on price only and full collusion, where firms collude on both price and quality. Under semicollusion, firms are assumed to choose product quality after an agreement on price is reached. We show that in the presence of demand uncertainty that cannot be contracted upon in the cartel agreement firms may be better off limiting their collusive agreement to price only.
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