Topics in the Design of Political and Economic Mechanisms
Bugarin, Mauricio Soares
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/85618
Description
Title
Topics in the Design of Political and Economic Mechanisms
Author(s)
Bugarin, Mauricio Soares
Issue Date
1997
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Williams, Steven R.
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Political Science, General
Language
eng
Abstract
Finally, the third essay analyzes conditions for the convexifiability of an agent's utility $u(a)$ viewed a function of his type. The study shows that if the set of types A is an m-dimensional rectangle, $m\ge1,$ then u can be assumed convex in a without loss of generality. In particular, in any unidimensional model where A is convex and compact, u is essentially convex. Furthermore, if A is a compact, strictly convex set and its boundary $\partial A$ is a level set of a nonsingular function, the study derives conditions on A and u ensuring that there exists a change of variables H such that $B=H\sp{-1}(A)$ is a convex set and the function $U=u\circ H:B\to\IR$ is strictly convex.
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