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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/85610
Description
Title
Essays on Multi-Object Auctions
Author(s)
Chakraborty, Indranil
Issue Date
1997
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Charles Kahn
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Finance
Language
eng
Abstract
The second chapter considers an auctioneer faced with a decision as whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction rule there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. In this situation both Vickrey auction and first-price auction yield the same expected revenue and the analysis is unchanged across revenue equivalent auction rules.
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