Essays on Two-Sided Search With Heterogeneous Agents
Chade, Hector Amado
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/85603
Description
Title
Essays on Two-Sided Search With Heterogeneous Agents
Author(s)
Chade, Hector Amado
Issue Date
1997
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Bart Taub
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Theory
Language
eng
Abstract
"The third essay analyzes the same set of issues but assuming a different information technology. It assumes that when two agents meet, each ""runs"" an imperfect test to estimate the type of the potential mate. Despite the complexity of the problem, I am able to characterize the equilibrium strategies and show that, if the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property holds, then positive sorting of agents by types will be observed in equilibrium. However, the segmentation of the market into clusters disappears."
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