Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies
Kim, Deuk-Won
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/85592
Description
Title
Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies
Author(s)
Kim, Deuk-Won
Issue Date
2008
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Theory
Language
eng
Abstract
This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
