Long -Term Agency Relationships and Human Capital Investment
Ma, Sufeng
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/84615
Description
Title
Long -Term Agency Relationships and Human Capital Investment
Author(s)
Ma, Sufeng
Issue Date
2000
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Susan I. Cohen
Department of Study
Business Administration
Discipline
Business Administration
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Labor
Language
eng
Abstract
The second part looks into situations where agents working in a team environment. The contract offers agents with a possibility of promotional prize, a fraction of an agent's own output and a share scheme of the firm's total output. Agents may allocate efforts into working on his own task assignments, helping team members and improving his own skills. We examine the decision making from agents' point of view within both short term and long term settings. Results of the models show that by adjusting the parameters of the contract, principal can affect agent's decision on their efforts allocation. Although the effects of agent's sharing of the outputs work similarly in different setting, the promotion prize may have completely different effects on the agent's decision.
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