Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees and Asymmetric Information in the Grocery Supply Chain
DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/83048
Description
Title
Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees and Asymmetric Information in the Grocery Supply Chain
Author(s)
DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn
Issue Date
2000
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Randall Westgren
Department of Study
Agricultural Economics
Discipline
Agricultural Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Agricultural
Language
eng
Abstract
Mechanism design framework and two moments of the product demand distribution are utilized to eliminate mean-variance dominated products and separate non-dominated products by their demand distributions. Model results suggest that accurately designed menus of contracts including retail prices, slotting allowances, failure fees (or success rebates) and sales targets can separate products by their demand distributions and alleviate asymmetric information problems. Adverse selection problems can be reduced by utilizing such mechanisms to align incentives for retailers and manufacturers when shelving new product introductions.
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