Credit-Output Interlinked Contracts: The Relationships Between Traders and Farmers
Sotomayor, Narda Lizette
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/83026
Description
Title
Credit-Output Interlinked Contracts: The Relationships Between Traders and Farmers
Author(s)
Sotomayor, Narda Lizette
Issue Date
1998
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Nelson, Charles H.
Department of Study
Agricultural Economics
Discipline
Agricultural Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Finance
Language
eng
Abstract
Within the repeated game framework, changes in the length of the review period, the farmer's probability of success, the reservation utilities of the parties, and their risk aversion are analyzed. In general, these changes affect the system of incentives designed to promote contract compliance, and therefore, the behavior of the parties and the conditions of the contracts.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
