The Dynamics of Congressional Behavior: Natural Experiments in Roll Call Voting, 1947--1997
Nokken, Timothy Peter
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/82605
Description
Title
The Dynamics of Congressional Behavior: Natural Experiments in Roll Call Voting, 1947--1997
Author(s)
Nokken, Timothy Peter
Issue Date
1999
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Brian R. Sala
Department of Study
Political Science
Discipline
Political Science
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
History, United States
Language
eng
Abstract
In my dissertation, I utilize a natural experimental methodology to investigate two broad questions. First, I seek to determine how certain political factors influence members' roll call voting behavior in the United States Congress in the years following WWII. Secondly, I investigate how individuals' roll call voting behavior influences their prospects for reelection. More specifically, I focus upon two factors thought to have an influence on members' roll call voting behavior: political parties and constituencies. I find that members who switch party affiliation while serving in Congress make significant changes in their voting behavior at the time they switch parties, while a subset of members who did not switch parties but resembled the party switchers exhibited no significant changes in their roll call behavior. This finding strongly supports the arguments of scholars who contend parties have a significant and independent influence on the roll call behavior of their members. On the constituency side, I find that some members who voluntarily leave Congress either by retirement or to seek statewide office make statistically significant but extremely modest changes in their voting behavior in their last year in office. To assess the effect of roll call behavior on reelection prospects, I revisit the puzzle of midterm seat losses for House members from the president's party, but at the individual level. While I do not offer a general model of roll call behavior, I argue these findings are consistent with a reputation-based explanation of roll call behavior. Members carefully craft their personal reputations of which roll call behavior is an important component. A reputation-based model also helps to make sense of seemingly contradictory findings: that members make big adjustments to their roll call behavior in some instances, while exhibiting only modest changes in others.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
