The Behavioral Consequences of Territorial Competition
Rider, Toby James
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/82588
Description
Title
The Behavioral Consequences of Territorial Competition
Author(s)
Rider, Toby James
Issue Date
2009
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Diehl, Paul F.
Department of Study
Political Science
Discipline
Political Science
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Political Science, International Relations
Language
eng
Abstract
"This dissertation project asks the fundamental question ""are there behavioral consequences of territorial threat?"" Extant theory suggests that state behavioral responses to threat vary according to stakes. In particular, it seems that threat to territory is different than other sources of disputes. Because of the salience of territorial stakes, states are more likely to adopt aggressive, military-oriented foreign policy practices when faced with perceived or real threat to territory. Collectively, such strategies are referred to as realpolitik (or power politics, often defined as the use of arms races, alliances, and bellicose rhetoric) and are believed to account, at least in part, for the propensity of territorial stakes to escalate to war. In short, realpolitik foreign policy practices are a behavioral consequence of territorial threat and act as intervening variables between territorial competition and escalation to war. Thus far, however, the assertion that realpolitik is more common in this context is assumed, rather than tested. In this dissertation, I propose a theory that attempts to link territorial competition to realpolitik behavior. Empirical analyses confirm that territorial competition increases the risk of rivalry formation and rivalry severity, as well as the likelihood that states will engage in arms buildups. No correlation is found between territorial threat and alliance behavior."
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