Elicitation Mode Effects on Group Decision-Making in a Step-Level Public Good Social Dilemma
Au, Wing Tung
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Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/82219
Description
Title
Elicitation Mode Effects on Group Decision-Making in a Step-Level Public Good Social Dilemma
Author(s)
Au, Wing Tung
Issue Date
1997
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Davis, James H.
Department of Study
Psychology
Discipline
Psychology
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Psychology, Social
Language
eng
Abstract
Research in group decision making has long been divided along the lines of categorical, e.g., a guilty versus not-guilty verdict as in a criminal trial, versus continuous decisions, e.g., a monetary budget allocation. The possibility that groups may share the same processes when making these two types of decisions was studied by contrasting groups that made a natural categorical decision (a categorical elicitation mode) with groups that first decided on a numerical value on a corresponding continuous scale, and then derived a categorical choice based on that continuous judgment (a continuous elicitation mode). This elicitation mode difference was examined in a sequential step-level public good social dilemma with a variable provision point. It was found that groups in both elicitation mode conditions followed a similar simple-majority process in making the group decisions. Computer simulations further suggested that group decisions made in the categorical elicitation mode would be more extreme than those in the continuous elicitation mode. A practical implication is that by strategic maneuver (or happenstance) a particular elicitation mode could be adopted, and the group decision could be steered one way or the other. The social dilemma context of the experiment provided the additional opportunity to study the effects of provision point uncertainty on public good provision. Computer simulations based on individuals' contribution decisions found that a fixed provision point would provide a public good more often than would a variable provision point. Although a provision point is often an uncertain forecast and is seldom an exact value, the simulation results suggested that a provision point should be specified as an exact value despite its inherent variability in order to ensure a high public good provision rate.
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