Reduced Complexity Mechanisms for Network Resource Allocation
Yang, Sichao
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Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/81050
Description
Title
Reduced Complexity Mechanisms for Network Resource Allocation
Author(s)
Yang, Sichao
Issue Date
2007
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Hajek, Bruce
Department of Study
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Discipline
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, General
Language
eng
Abstract
Finally, we show that the VCG-Kelly mechanism can be applied to reduce the complexity of a combinatorial auction if the users' valuation functions satisfy the strong substitute condition. We investigate the properties of substitute functions. The sufficient and necessary condition for a function to be substitute appears quite strong and network users' valuation functions are not substitute generally.
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