The Use of Noncooperative Games to Determine Strategic Bidding in Centralized Electricity Markets
Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/80786
Description
Title
The Use of Noncooperative Games to Determine Strategic Bidding in Centralized Electricity Markets
Author(s)
Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores
Issue Date
2002
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Overbye, Thomas J.
Department of Study
Electrical Engineering
Discipline
Electrical Engineering
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Engineering, Electronics and Electrical
Language
eng
Abstract
However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
