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The nature of intuitions and their role in material object metaphysics
Higgins, Andrew
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/72936
Description
- Title
- The nature of intuitions and their role in material object metaphysics
- Author(s)
- Higgins, Andrew
- Issue Date
- 2015-01-21
- Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)
- Waskan, Jonathan
- Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
- Waskan, Jonathan
- Committee Member(s)
- Korman, Daniel Z.
- Baillargeon, Renée
- Alexander, Joshua
- Department of Study
- Philosophy
- Discipline
- Philosophy
- Degree Granting Institution
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Degree Name
- Ph.D.
- Degree Level
- Dissertation
- Keyword(s)
- intuition
- meta-philosophy
- metaphysics
- philosophy of mind
- Abstract
- I argue for three central theses: ‘intuition’ is ambiguous, in material object metaphysics ‘intuition’ refers to pre-theoretical beliefs, and these pre-theoretical beliefs are generated by an innate physical reasoning system. I begin by outlining the relevant background discussions on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophy to motivate the need for a more careful investigation of the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the role of intuitions in specific sub-disciplines of philosophy. In chapters one and two I argue that ‘intuition’ is ambiguous between an inflationary and deflationary sense. In the inflationary sense, ‘intuition’ refers to a priori intellectual seemings with a special phenomenology, conceptual etiology, and modal content. In the deflationary sense, ‘intuition’ refers to beliefs or inclinations to believe. In chapter three I specifically examine the use of intuitions in material object metaphysics and conclude that in this sub-community ‘intuition’ is used in the deflationary sense to refer to pre-theoretical beliefs. Drawing from research on infant cognition, in the final chapter I argue that intuitions regarding material object metaphysics are those judgments that arise from an innate physical reasoning system. Based on this empirical observation, I argue that metaphysicians ought to give preference to abstract intuitions over intuitions regarding concrete cases because these abstract intuitions reflect the innate structure of our physical reasoning mechanisms.
- Graduation Semester
- 2014-12
- Permalink
- http://hdl.handle.net/2142/72936
- Copyright and License Information
- Copyright 2014 Andrew Higgins
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