University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

The nature of intuitions and their role in material object metaphysics

Higgins, Andrew

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Andrew_Higgins.pdf

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/72936

Description

Title
The nature of intuitions and their role in material object metaphysics
Author(s)
Higgins, Andrew
Issue Date
2015-01-21
Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)
Waskan, Jonathan
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Waskan, Jonathan
Committee Member(s)
  • Korman, Daniel Z.
  • Baillargeon, Renée
  • Alexander, Joshua
Department of Study
Philosophy
Discipline
Philosophy
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Date of Ingest
2015-01-21T19:49:37Z
Keyword(s)
  • intuition
  • meta-philosophy
  • metaphysics
  • philosophy of mind
Abstract
I argue for three central theses: ‘intuition’ is ambiguous, in material object metaphysics ‘intuition’ refers to pre-theoretical beliefs, and these pre-theoretical beliefs are generated by an innate physical reasoning system. I begin by outlining the relevant background discussions on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophy to motivate the need for a more careful investigation of the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the role of intuitions in specific sub-disciplines of philosophy. In chapters one and two I argue that ‘intuition’ is ambiguous between an inflationary and deflationary sense. In the inflationary sense, ‘intuition’ refers to a priori intellectual seemings with a special phenomenology, conceptual etiology, and modal content. In the deflationary sense, ‘intuition’ refers to beliefs or inclinations to believe. In chapter three I specifically examine the use of intuitions in material object metaphysics and conclude that in this sub-community ‘intuition’ is used in the deflationary sense to refer to pre-theoretical beliefs. Drawing from research on infant cognition, in the final chapter I argue that intuitions regarding material object metaphysics are those judgments that arise from an innate physical reasoning system. Based on this empirical observation, I argue that metaphysicians ought to give preference to abstract intuitions over intuitions regarding concrete cases because these abstract intuitions reflect the innate structure of our physical reasoning mechanisms.
Graduation Semester
2014-12
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http://hdl.handle.net/2142/72936
Copyright and License Information
Copyright 2014 Andrew Higgins

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