Status and Integrative Complexity in Decision-Making Groups: Evidence From the United States Supreme Court and a Laboratory Experiment
Gruenfeld, Deborah H.
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/72132
Description
Title
Status and Integrative Complexity in Decision-Making Groups: Evidence From the United States Supreme Court and a Laboratory Experiment
Author(s)
Gruenfeld, Deborah H.
Issue Date
1993
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Wyer, Robert S., Jr.
Department of Study
Psychology
Discipline
Psychology
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Law
Psychology, Social
Speech Communication
Political Science, General
Abstract
Integrative complexity is a measure of the tendency to consider decision-relevant information from more than one perspective, or in terms of more than one dimension. A "status-contingency model" is proposed to explain the determinants of integrative complexity in decision-making groups. Based on findings from the integrative complexity and social influence literatures, the model predicts higher levels of complexity among members of majority factions than among members of either minority factions or unanimous groups. Theoretically, these differences are attributed to affect and arousal, which mediate both the processing and expression of information in group decision contexts. The model was supported using two methodological approaches. A content analysis of Supreme Court opinions (Study 1) showed that both minority opinions and unanimous opinions were conveyed with less integrative complexity than non-unanimous majority opinions, and this was true regardless of the ideological content of the arguments expressed. That is, the opinions of liberal and moderate policy makers did not differ in complexity from those of conservatives, when the status of the opinions in the decision-making group was controlled. Thus, previously proposed ideology-contingency hypotheses (Tetlock, 1983a; 1984; 1986; Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, 1985) were not supported. A laboratory experiment (Study 2), using ad hoc groups performing a judicial decision-making task, established (a) the generalizability of this finding to other group decision contexts, and (b) the extent to which it reflects differences in private cognition, or in public communication. The effects of status on integrative complexity were identical under public and private communication conditions, so they cannot be attributed to communication strategies alone. Under public communication conditions, expressions of affect and arousal (a) resembled those in Study 1, and (b) occurred independently of the effects of member status on integrative complexity. Here, expressions of affect and arousal reflected status-specific communication strategies, rather than responses to the decision task itself. In contrast, under private communication conditions, expressions of affect and arousal (a) were consistent with predictions about the effects of member status on cognitive processing, and (b) mediated the effects of member status on integrative complexity. Implications of these results for the reactions of majority, minority and unanimous group members to group decision making are discussed.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
