Having and Being an Ideal-Self: An Essay at Understanding Un-Iffy Freedom
Anderson, Charles Frank
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/71563
Description
Title
Having and Being an Ideal-Self: An Essay at Understanding Un-Iffy Freedom
Author(s)
Anderson, Charles Frank
Issue Date
1987
Department of Study
Philosophy
Discipline
Philosophy
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Philosophy
Abstract
While discussing pure-libertarianism, hard-determinism, and soft-determinism, the author adopts the latter, not only because he thinks this characterization of freedom accounts best for various common intuitions about freedom, but because this view of freedom is compatible with the determinism that he assumes to be true.
In chapter two a variety of cases are discussed to reach the following conclusion: the soft-deterministic conception of freedom does not capture what we mean when we say that someone has a free will. This "other freedom" is named "un-iffy freedom,"and three accounts of it are discussed in the remainder of the chapter. The claims made are that all three accounts are "good descriptions" of something that can be described well in various ways, and that each philosopher discussed has failed to say enough about what it means for a person to "identify with" a desire, motive, etc.
In chapter three the notion of an "Ideal-Self" is introduced, explained, and refined. An Ideal-Self is a person's "honestly articulated Conception of how they would really/most prefer to be/become." The central claims of the essay are that "having an Ideal-Self is a necessary condition of being un-iffy free," and that "being one's Ideal-Self is a sufficient condition of being un-iffy free."
In chapter four it is argued that the notion of an Ideal-Self can be employed to explain better what it means for an agent to have "identified with" a desire, motive, etc. Moreover, it is argued that this notion also allows one to explain the "full-blown-un-iffy freedom" of the person who lives a life ordered by a plan of their own conscious construction. In these terms, it is then argued, not only that the un-iffy unfree are legion, but that actions per se are usually irrelevant when "true freedom" is at issue.
In the final chapter an answer is suggested to the following question: How we can actually be/become un-iffy freer than we are?
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
