Foreign Policy and National Development: The Brazilian Experiment Under Vargas, 1951-1954 (Economic Policies, Dependency)
Cardoso-Silva, Vera Alice
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/70491
Description
Title
Foreign Policy and National Development: The Brazilian Experiment Under Vargas, 1951-1954 (Economic Policies, Dependency)
Author(s)
Cardoso-Silva, Vera Alice
Issue Date
1985
Department of Study
History
Discipline
History
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, History
Abstract
This dissertation treats the contribution of Getulio Vargas' last administration (1951-1954) to the development model which characterized Brazil's postwar history. It demonstrates that Vargas set the basic pattern of the recent phases of the country's industrialization. The State reserved for itself the task of providing most of the basic services and industries. Manufacturing and the other sectors, including the strategic banking system, were largely left to private initiative.
The work describes how Vargas' strategy of development relied on American assistance through loans to the Brazilian government, or to entrepreneurs who had the government's endorsement. From the U.S., Vargas also expected technological cooperation in development projects; he also expected preference to Brazil in the granting of export licenses for industrial equipment and raw materials, both of which the U.S. government placed under strict controls during the Korean War.
Another major assumption of Vargas' plan was that the federal government would be greatly strengthened economically and financially as development proceeded, since it would not only invest large amounts of money in development projects, but would also become the largest owner of basic services and industries. The conjuction of these two approaches to development contributed to serious dysfunctions in the constitutional regime, which was finally overthrown in the coup of 1964.
The work's main contribution to the understanding of Vargas' last administration is the emphasis it puts on the influence of external factors on the outcome of his development policies. The policy of stockpiling, consistently pursued in 1951, occasioned the balance of payment crisis, the consequences of which gradually alienated exporters and industrialists, while simultaneously increasing inflation. In 1951, such policy derived from a (rational) expectation of the outbreak of the Third World War. It turned out to be wrong, but in the short run the diminution of foreign exchange for essential imports and for the service of profits remittances greatly contributed to the economic and political crises Vargas had to face in 1953 and 1954. Yet the same fear stimulating stockpiling also gave impetus to the political will to industrialize and modernize the country.
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