Confidence and Accuracy in Concurrent and Predictive Judgments of Performance
Paese, Paul William
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Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/69720
Description
Title
Confidence and Accuracy in Concurrent and Predictive Judgments of Performance
Author(s)
Paese, Paul William
Issue Date
1988
Department of Study
Psychology
Discipline
Psychology
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Psychology, Industrial
Abstract
Two laboratory experiments were conducted to examine how characteristics of the judgment process may affect the appropriateness of confidence in judgment. Specifically, the tendency to generate evidence supporting one's own judgment was expected to increase with effort, task experience, decision making, and the availability of relevant information. Confidence in judgment was therefore expected to increase as a result of this heightened tendency. Accuracy in judgment was not expected to increase as much as confidence. Two hundred and seventy eight male participants used various measures of baseball performance to predict the overall performance of 50 to 100 professional baseball players. Feedback on judgments was not provided. The judgment task was designed to simulate the ability assessment and performance prediction activities commonly performed by practitioners in applicant selection settings. Consistent with predictions, results showed that confidence in concurrent and predictive judgments increased with both effort and task experience, whereas accuracy sometimes increased and under other conditions remained the same. Contrary to expectations, confidence in judgment was lowest when decisions based on judgment had already been made. This seemingly counterintuitive result is explained in relation to recent research on the effects of choice on subjective confidence. Finally, the availability of relevant information had only small effects on confidence, although these results were in the expected directions; statistical power in this analysis was low. The results are interpreted in light of a heuristic model of subjective uncertainty in judgment, and implications for performance prediction and decision making in organizations are discussed.
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