The Case Against Foundationalism: An Examination of Some Main Anti-Foundational Arguments
Harker, Jay Everett
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/68409
Description
Title
The Case Against Foundationalism: An Examination of Some Main Anti-Foundational Arguments
Author(s)
Harker, Jay Everett
Issue Date
1981
Department of Study
Philosophy
Discipline
Philosophy
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Philosophy
Language
eng
Abstract
The primary purpose of this study is to critically assess some of the main objections that have been raised against foundational theories of epistemic justification. Toward this end I begin in the Introduction by defining some key terms, giving a first (somewhat rough) characterization of foundationalism, and providing a list of ten sorts of anti-foundational arguments to be considered.
Chapter I is devoted to a study of the so-called "regress argument." This study is essential for my purposes, since I am defining foundationalism in terms of the regress argument's conclusion. I examine various objections that foundationalists have offered against claims that chains of justified beliefs may end in "blind posits," continue infinitely, or form loops or circles. After conducting this study I am able to more precisely define foundationalism.
In Chapter II I am concerned to expose various putative anti-foundational arguments that turn out to be, literally, irrelevant. That is, the three argument-types considered in Chapter II are such that, even if they are sound they fail to show that foundationalism is untenable.
Since the regress argument plays such a major role in providing both motivation and rational support for foundational theories of justification, it is important to assess the merits of various sorts of anti-foundational arguments meant to show that the regress argument is unsound. An assessment of two such argument-types is the central focus of Chapter III.
Finally, Chapter IV is devoted to an examination of the five kinds of anti-foundational arguments from our original list not covered in previous chapters. My final conclusion is that reports of the death of foundationalism have been greatly exaggerated; foundationalism has by no means shown false or unreasonable.
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