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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/47032
Description
Title
Forward Capacity Auction Simulation
Author(s)
Keng, Seng Khai
Contributor(s)
Gross, George
Issue Date
2009-05
Keyword(s)
electricity markets
auctions
forward-capacity auctions
auction simulation
auction modeling
Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the ISO-NE forward capacity auction process using a mathematical model that we formulated for this purpose. We apply the AIMMS, an advanced optimization software package to simulate the model with price-quantity-pair offers by each player as input data and determine the market clearing price. This thesis also discusses the sensitivity of the market outcomes with respect to the offers submitted by set of players. We evaluate the clearing prices and capacity from each generator for different offers submitted. In addition, we explore how the bidding behavior of players will affect the market outcomes.
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