This paper develops an alternative view on the motivation to hedge. A conceptual model shows
how hedging facilitates contract relationships between firms and can solve conflicts between
firms. In this model, firms’ contract preferences, level of power and conflicts in contractual
relationships are driving usage of futures contracts. The model shows how using futures markets
can provide a jointly preferred contracting arrangement, thereby enhancing relationships
between firms. The robust nature of the conceptual model is empirically examined through a
computer-guided study of various firms.
Publisher
Office for Futures and Options Research, Department of Agricultural Economics, College of Agricultural, Consumer, and Environmental Sciences at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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