No middle way: Franklin D. Roosevelt and limited war, 1940-1942
Bunch, Stephen G.
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/23807
Description
Title
No middle way: Franklin D. Roosevelt and limited war, 1940-1942
Author(s)
Bunch, Stephen G.
Issue Date
1994
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Widenor, William C.
Department of Study
History, United States
History, Modern
Discipline
History, United States
History, Modern
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
History, United States
History, Modern
Language
eng
Abstract
From March, 1941, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin D. Roosevelt pursued a policy of de facto undeclared war on Germany--a policy clearly designed to contain German expansion by limited means--while fully expecting that this essentially defensive policy could persist indefinitely. But meanwhile his public discourse depicted the Nazi threat to America as overwhelming, and he demanded the total defeat of Hitler's regime. To continue with this limited/unlimited dual-track policy would in time likely have risked his political prestige both at home and abroad. Pearl Harbor and Hitler's subsequent declaration of war led the President to resolve his mounting predicament by discarding the policy of limited means and endorsing total war in Europe.
Several questions inform the body of this study: first, why did FDR pursue diverging rhetorical and policy paths? Second, why did the President, as it became clear to him and to others that the British and Soviets likely would continue to resist Hitler effectively with limited American aid, favor, and finally opt for an unlimited-war-aim/unlimited-means combination rather than for continuing his policy of limited means and then matching it with a limited war aim? Third, after Hitler's operation BARBAROSSA, were FDR's continuing assumptions about the scope and nature of the Nazi threat, coupled with his uncompromising rhetoric, conducive to prudent and flexible policymaking? Yet given the American self-image as moral citadel or moral redeemer, and given the not unrelated isolationist/interventionist political divide, did he truly have any policy alternatives? Lastly, what were the effects of FDR's assumptions, methods, and policies on the behavior of succeeding administrations?
This study examines these questions by tracing FDR and his administration's words and actions, especially for the critical months of 1941. Also considered is Roosevelt's personal background, along with political, ideological, and bureaucratic forces that may have influenced his decisions. The evidence suggests that, more than is true for many presidents, FDR's background and personal predilections shaped U.S. policy toward Germany in the years 1941 and 1942. In turn, FDR's record probably contributed to a Cold War containment doctrine that in practice occasionally suffered from similar dichotomies and excesses.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
