University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

The emergence and growth of financial intermediaries in an economy with nonzero transaction costs and asymmetric information

Buscaglia, Edgardo

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Description

Title
The emergence and growth of financial intermediaries in an economy with nonzero transaction costs and asymmetric information
Author(s)
Buscaglia, Edgardo
Issue Date
1989
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Ulen, Thomas S.
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
  • Economics, Commerce-Business
  • Economics, Finance
  • Business Administration, Banking
Language
eng
Abstract
  • The economic analysis of financial intermediaries has been a growing field. The goal of many works in this area has been to show that contractual arrangements can lead to symmetric Pareto optimal allocations in an economy with asymmetric private information.
  • In this thesis, financial intermediaries should be understood as coalitions of professionals producing information about the value of firms. Within this framework of analysis, I challenge the prevailing view that economies of scale and risk diversification are the most important explanatory variables for the emergence of financial intermediaries. Instead, I develop an explanation for this emergence based on the formation of coalitions designed to internalize risks but also taking into consideration organizational costs and externalities in the production of information. A microeconomic stochastic model is used, assuming that the sets of firms, investors, and information producers (financial intermediaries) operate in a highly competitive environment under information asymmetry before and after the loan contract is formed.
Type of Resource
text
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http://hdl.handle.net/2142/23396
Copyright and License Information
Copyright 1989 Buscaglia, Edgardo

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