Rules for water allocation in a small watershed: A game theoretic approach
Saleth, R. Maria
This item is only available for download by members of the University of Illinois community. Students, faculty, and staff at the U of I may log in with your NetID and password to view the item. If you are trying to access an Illinois-restricted dissertation or thesis, you can request a copy through your library's Inter-Library Loan office or purchase a copy directly from ProQuest.
Permalink
https://hdl.handle.net/2142/22617
Description
Title
Rules for water allocation in a small watershed: A game theoretic approach
Author(s)
Saleth, R. Maria
Issue Date
1989
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Braden, John B.
Department of Study
Agricultural and Consumer Economics
Discipline
Agricultural and Consumer Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Agricultural
Language
eng
Abstract
"Exchanges of either long term rights (property right transfer) or spot rights (rights rental) to water may result in third party effects that place practical limits on the geographic scope of a water market. The result will be a market with few eligible participants. A ""thin"" market suffers from strategic manipulation and allocational distortions. Using a game theoretic approach based on multilateral bargaining models, this study addresses the issue of designing trade rules to facilitate smooth functioning of a thin spot rights market operating in a variety of exchange environments."
Six different trade rules were analyzed under 24 exchange environments. Numerical results were based on a hypothetical water market operating in conditions representing the Crane Creek Watershed of Kankakee County, Illinois. The water market equilibria under various trade rules and exchange environments were identified by simulating the multilateral bargaining among the participants. By comparing these equilibria, the relative efficacy of the candidate trade rules was determined.
The results were that a price bidding signal produced maximal gains in most environments and the settlements based on the average of the buyer's and seller's prices performed best in most cases. As the market size increases, the bargaining equilibrium prices resulting from various trade rules converge to the competitive equilibrium prices in all exchange environments.
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
