The role of courts in regulatory policy: The case of telecommunications regulation
Chen, Mingsiang
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/21131
Description
Title
The role of courts in regulatory policy: The case of telecommunications regulation
Author(s)
Chen, Mingsiang
Issue Date
1996
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Carmen, Ira H.
Department of Study
Political Science
Discipline
Political Science
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Law
Political Science, General
Mass Communications
Language
eng
Abstract
Courts involve in regulatory policy by means of statutory judicial review, and a theory of statutory judicial review is needed to account for judicial behavior in this respect. The theory this essay presents structures statutory judicial review as a game in which players try to materialize their motives as much as possible. The ultimate outcome of this game depends on courts' strategic choices made under constraints imposed by their motives and other players' strategic choices. The theory is verified by applying to a dozen cases regarding a policy area characterized by massive judicial intervention, namely, the telecommunications regulation.
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