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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/21075
Description
Title
Cheap-talk pregame communication
Author(s)
Santos, Vasco Manuel Sousa Borges dos
Issue Date
1991
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Arvan, Lanny David
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Economics, Theory
Language
eng
Abstract
We study a form of pre-game communication, namely, cheap-talk. The framework first proposed by Farrell (1987) is extended to symmetric games with a finite but otherwise arbitrary number of actions. An alternative theory of cheap-talk pre-game communication is proposed and its effects characterized. Farrell (1987) modelled cheap-talk with players making simultaneous announcements. We study cheap-talk with sequential announcements. The welfare implications of cheap-talk are also discussed.
Type of Resource
text
Permalink
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21075
Copyright and License Information
Copyright 1991 Santos, Vasco Manuel Sousa Borges dos
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