Using Prediction Markets to Motivate Public Participation in Patent Examination

Jian, Lian

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/15006 Copy

Description

Title

Using Prediction Markets to Motivate Public Participation in Patent Examination

Author(s)

Jian, Lian

Issue Date

2010-02-03

Keyword(s)

• Intellectual Property
• Patent
• Markets

Abstract

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is overburdened with a large volume of patent applications while having limited resources to conduct patent examinations. The patent examination process is too long and the quality of issued patents is questioned by the public. We propose to alleviate these problems by setting up prediction markets for each pending patent. In these prediction markets, traders buy and sell bets for the outcomes of patent examinations. Our proposed prediction markets can create social value in two ways. First, they generate forecasts about the likelihood of the pending patents being granted. Before the USPTO completes the examination, decision makers in need of information about the outcome of the patent examination can use these forecasts to make strategic decisions about research and development plans, or investments in the technologies being patented. Second, our proposal creates explicit incentives for public participation in the patent examination process. The proposed prediction markets reward traders with insights into the pending patent, potentially motivating traders to independently perform prior art search --- a central task in evaluating patentability. The USPTO can then collect these prior art for reference by giving small rewards to traders who submit relevant prior art.

Type of Resource

text

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http://hdl.handle.net/2142/15006

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