“Bringing the state back in:” How did street rallies, non-protest performances, ideological rhetoric, radical policies, and violent contentions give rise to the movement regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1988-2010)?

Teimourigerdeh, Amirhossein

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Description

Title

“Bringing the state back in:” How did street rallies, non-protest performances, ideological rhetoric, radical policies, and violent contentions give rise to the movement regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1988-2010)?

Author(s)

Teimourigerdeh, Amirhossein

Issue Date

2023-07-11

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Leicht , Kevin

Doctoral Committee Chair(s)

Leicht , Kevin

Committee Member(s)

• Liao, Tim
• Dill, Brian
• Marshall, Anna-Maria
• Sadri, Mahmoud

Department of Study

Sociology

Discipline

Sociology

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Degree Level

Dissertation

Keyword(s)

• Islamic Republic of Iran
• Movement Regimes
• State-Organized Movements
• Contentious Politics
• Ideology

Abstract

Studies on social movements and contentious politics have largely treated states and/or political regimes as the target of anti-authority movements. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is an important case in theorizing the central role of political regimes in shaping state-organized mobilizations (SOMs). Taking cues from research on contentious politics, SOMs, populism, ideology, and particularly Tucker’s foundational article (1961) on the Soviet Union as a “movement regime,” I substantially upgrade the movement regime (MR) theory. Broadly, I articulate the new theory of MRs as creating politically, socially, ideologically, and culturally contentious space by highlighting the Iranian regime’s deployment of protest rallies; harsh policies; violent contentions; radical, but flexible, rhetoric; and non-protest and non-violent performances. The new theory of MRs is built on five state-led (known as regime-led in Iran) forces: First, protest events include, but are not limited to, pro-hijab rallies and anti-US demonstrations. Second, radical policies comprise criminalizing a broad range of civil society activities. Third, ideological and revolutionary rhetoric encompasses a wide variety of discourses produced by pro-regime elites, organizations, and factions. Ideological rhetoric, however, was and is flexible. Fourth, violent contentions take on several extreme actions by pro-regime social actors, from attacking foreign embassies to disrupting opposition group meetings. Finally, by theorizing non-protest and non-violent performative contentions, I demonstrate that MRs extend beyond street rallies, ideological rhetoric, radical policies, and violent actions. They mobilize their supporters with an expansive spectrum of performative contentions, such as innovative religious ceremonies. Non-protest performances help MRs enhance their repertoire of actions and extend their ideology beyond their national borders. The IRI’s concern with the Arba’een pilgrimage in Iraq is an example of the Iranian regime’s expansive ideology that crosses its national borders. This research is built on a unique longitudinal media dataset from July 1988 until January 2010. Moreover, I have used various surveys to not only build upon the theory of MRs but also show the IRI’s appeal to the broader populace as well as its paradoxes and flexibilities. I use protest event evaluation, critical discourse analysis, survey datasets, and my own observations from Iran to further the theory of movement regimes.

Graduation Semester

2023-08

Type of Resource

Thesis

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2023 Amirhossein Teimourigerdeh

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