The asymmetrical dynamics of market powers with normatively misaligned partners: The EU-Israel case study

Nathan, Benjamin

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/120155 Copy

Description

Title

The asymmetrical dynamics of market powers with normatively misaligned partners: The EU-Israel case study

Author(s)

Nathan, Benjamin

Issue Date

2023-05-04

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Kourtikakis, Konstantinos

Committee Member(s)

Dobczansky, Markian

Department of Study

Liberal Arts & Sciences

Discipline

European Union Studies

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

M.A.

Degree Level

Thesis

Keyword(s)

• Compliance
• European Union
• Israel
• Normative alignment

Abstract

The EU-Israel relationship is singular on the world stage. Israel is the only country party to both an Association Agreement (AA) and Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) with the EU and the first (and most contributive) of just two non-European countries to associate with the European Research Area. Considering how EU-Israel relationship is characterized by a normative asymmetry, with the two actors’ economic-normative outlooks aligned and their political-normative outlooks misaligned, the EU – being a normative actor that seeks out similarly minded partners – is expected try to rectify this misalignment. Instead, Israeli noncompliance with EU agreements is answered with leniency and the initiation of new agreements rather than punishment. This begs the question of why is the EU-Israel relationship so privileged despite Israel’s noncompliance with their agreements and neglection of the EU’s condemnations? The prevailing theories explaining the EU’s leniency towards Israel are flawed and fail to explain the EU’s actions. Therefore, a new theory of EU-Israel relations is developed throughout this thesis. Using qualitative analysis, two hypotheses related to Israel’s compliance with the EU-Israel AA were tested and supported. Israel’s compliance with the AA is shown to be dependent on how strictly a given section is written, with vaguely written rules being less costly and less enforceable. The EU is further shown to be aware of, and account for, Israel’s compliance preferences. Recognizing that Israel would not ratify the AA if it contained strict, political rules due its political misalignment with the EU, they were left vague and thus uncostly in the event of noncompliance. Knowing that Israel would find economic rules more agreeable, the AA’s economically-oriented sections were written strictly and in a manner that compliance with them facilitated precisely the political reform that the vague rules were intended to.

Graduation Semester

2023-05

Type of Resource

Thesis

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2023 Benjamin Nathan

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