Trade credit

Zare, Meysam

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/106492 Copy

Description

Title

Trade credit

Author(s)

Zare, Meysam

Issue Date

2019-12-06

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Bernhardt, Mark D

Doctoral Committee Chair(s)

Bernhardt, Mark D

Committee Member(s)

• Krasa, Stefan
• Parente, Stephen L
• Kahn, Charles M

Department of Study

Economics

Discipline

Economics

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Degree Level

Dissertation

Date of Ingest

2020-03-02T22:38:57Z

Keyword(s)

Stationary Equilibrium, Dynamic Contract, Trade Credit

Abstract

This dissertation develops a new tractable solution method to calculate the set of equilibrium outcomes for a broad variety of dynamic economic models. These outcomes---players' payoffs in repeated games, continuation values of agents in recursive contracts, or the set of stationary distributions in recursive competitive equilibria---are given by the fixed-points of a class of set-valued contraction mapping operators. I then use the method to analyze a dynamic model of trade credit. This model features a principal/seller of an intermediate good who repeatedly sells on credit and lacks collateral to a cash-constrained buyer/agent who receives new history dependent private information each period and takes private and public actions, including, possibly, defaulting on his debt.

Graduation Semester

2019-12

Type of Resource

text

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http://hdl.handle.net/2142/106492

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2019 Meysam Zare

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