How are price fixing agreements unfair?

Delvasto Perdomo, Carlos

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/105884 Copy

Description

Title

How are price fixing agreements unfair?

Author(s)

Delvasto Perdomo, Carlos

Issue Date

2019-07-02

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Lawless, Robert

Doctoral Committee Chair(s)

Lawless, Robert

Committee Member(s)

• Bilz, Kenworthey
• Robbennolt, Jennifer K.
• Ulen, Thomas

Department of Study

Law

Discipline

Law

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

J.S.D.

Degree Level

Dissertation

Keyword(s)

• Antitrust law price-fixing agreements
• moral intuitions
• experimental surveys
• dual entitlement theory
• double effect doctrine
• Price Fixing Attitude Scale.

Abstract

Antitrust law is trapped in a labyrinth of its own making. The assumption that consumer welfare and efficiency is the sole concern of antitrust law conflicts with what people view as unfair about antitrust law. The present thesis advances the understanding of antitrust law by providing some theoretical considerations and empirical results of what people view as unfair regarding price-fixing agreements. People's attitudes towards price fixing were obtained through experimental surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk in the United States. The empirical results suggest that people view it as unfair when they feel that businesses rip them off through unequal transactions, such as price fixing and other forms of collusive behavior. But there is more to it than that. The evidence also suggests that people's price-fixing attitudes vary depending on the circumstances. The empirical results suggest that people judge price fixing as a moral violation influenced by the dual entitlement principle and the double effect theory. Moreover, results suggest that people’s intuitions about price fixing are not static and move whenever the social and moral context changes.

Graduation Semester

2019-08

Type of Resource

text

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http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105884

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2019, Carlos Delvasto

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