University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Reputation in continuous-time games with multiple commitment types

Ryu, Seokjong

Content Files
RYU-DISSERTATION-2017.pdf

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/97706

Description

Title
Reputation in continuous-time games with multiple commitment types
Author(s)
Ryu, Seokjong
Issue Date
2017-04-17
Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)
  • Williams, Steven R.
  • Cho, In-Koo
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Williams, Steven R.
Committee Member(s)
  • Perry, Martin K.
  • Lemus, Jorge
Department of Study
Economics
Discipline
Economics
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Date of Ingest
2017-08-10T20:32:56Z
Keyword(s)
  • Reputation
  • Continuous-time games
  • Multiple commitment types
Abstract
We study a continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs.
Graduation Semester
2017-05
Type of Resource
text
Permalink
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/97706
Copyright and License Information
Copyright 2017 Seokjong Ryu

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