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Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!

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Introduction

The commissioning by *International Studies* of Stephen M. Walt's essay "The Renaissance of Security Studies" opens a much needed debate about what scholars and practitioners mean by security and what precisely they think they are studying and why.¹ This critique responds to the essay's welcome call for cooperative collaboration and diversity to widen and deepen the discussion.

The article while helpful errs on several critical counts. Analytically it limits the objects of study and *ipso facto* constricts the scope of relevant theory needed to understand and explain what security is and what security problems are. Normatively it focuses almost exclusively on American national security rather than on international security or security *per se* and in the name of relevance delegates too much of the agenda of security studies to policymakers. Methodologically it restricts security studies to a highly selective and largely traditional array of disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches. As a consequence of these flaws the essay is inevitably incomplete in its survey of security studies in its assignation of worth and priority to different theoretical approaches and specific works and in its sketch of a research agenda.

The essay's avowedly neo-realist position if permitted by default to guide the field puts at risk several important aims shared by many accomplished scholars and scientists concerned with security studies: the field's potential within the academy; the interdisciplinary examination of security problems hitherto shunned or slighted by Cold War concerns; the flow of ideas from the academy to policymakers, a development celebrated by the essay as a renaissance in security studies; the search for better ways and for more varied disciplinary approaches to teach security studies where immense progress has been made thanks to foundation and governmental support; and the legitimate pursuit of significant lines of research and innovative methods that promise to make important contributions to security theory and to the resolution of armed conflict, which may not be compatible with realist strictures.

This critique aims less at detailing the essay's failings than at widening the debate about how security analysts can develop a richer conceptual, a broader interdisciplinary, a theoretically more inclusive, and not ironically, a more policy relevant understanding of security studies than what the survey presents. Citations are illustrative, not exhaustive, since my reservations about the survey are conceptual and valuational, not bibliographic.

Flaws in Definition: Implications for Social Science Theory

The essay defines security studies as *the study of the threat, use, and control of military force*.² To be included as central in the definition of security studies, a work must essentially fit comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm and address phenomena that can be controlled by national leaders. These conditions—*theoretical significance as realism and national relevance as defined by factors under the purported control of policymakers*—are key parameters of the essay's notion of the scope of security studies and what are or what should be viewed as contributions to the literature. Alternative definitions of security are not noted, much less explored, nor is a case made for so narrow a conception of the field. The problem of what are security studies is simply defined away by identifying it essentially with the study of war and diplomacy between states.

This definitional issue is not trivial. How analysts and practitioners define security problems determines what they think is important. Definitions elicit questions that must be answered if empirical and normative theory and problem solving are to be advanced. The questions asked, as any scientist or normative theorist

1 Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (1991): 211-239.

2 Emphasis in the original, p. 212.

knows are more important than provisional answers. The task then is to ask the right questions or—if one is charged with surveying a field—to ask at least how published scholars and statesmen have posed the problem of security rather than preemptively advance a particular answer to a question never fully posed, much less satisfactorily explored.

If the essay's circumscribed idea of security studies were logically and systematically applied, important security problems—even on neo-realist exclusionary grounds—could not be reached and, if addressed, then only indirectly and obliquely as tributaries of interstate conflict and war. If the essay rules in first image threats to the state by omission, it rules out as primary concerns security threats posed by states to groups and individuals. The rationale, manipulative techniques, and coercive measures and institutionalized forms of repression of authoritarian regimes are proper and primary objects of study for security analysts and practitioners. Death squads in Central and Latin America, the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and Pol Pot's Cambodia, as well as the causes of the Holocaust, the Gulag, and killing fields, are security issues of the first magnitude. They need study by security scholars and policymakers whether they fall within the essay's conceptual horizon or not.

Also worthy of study are the armed pursuits, strategies, and claims of non-state actors, like Palestinians, Kurds, Croates, Serbs, or the African National Congress. Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and low intensity warfare, as the arm of the weak and disenfranchised, are no less central to security studies. These forms of armed conflict (about which, incidentally, much has been written although not reviewed in the survey) are likely to become increasingly more important as ethnic and nationality wars within nation states and so-called internationalized civil wars, like Lebanon, that spill over national boundaries become more frequent. Certainly the state is threatened by these movements (and they merit study from a state-centric perspective), but the emergence of these social movements also suggests that the state is often a major source of international insecurity—the problem, not the solution, to international security.

In this vein, given the criteria directing the essay's conception of security studies, the threats posed by military and police bureaucracies, military industrial complexes, and standing armies to open societies can be addressed only when these problems are somehow causally linked to interstate wars. Disciplining organized and institutionalized violence to civil purposes is tolerated in the survey as a subfield of study, but only as a function of violent national conflicts, and not as an independent security issue in its own right. The normative and empirical theorizing of the *Federalist* writers, to create a popular government strong enough to resist foreign aggression but limited in its political and military power to tyrannize its own people, is logically, arguably, fatally excluded from the essay's portrayal of security studies.

Second image analysis of security problems fares no better. *Coups d'état* and civil wars, as the struggle between groups for the control of the state's monopoly of legitimate violence, are slighted as key security issues. These armed conflicts—arising, as often as not, from clashing atavistic urges and prompted by profound ideological, communal, national, ethnic, racial, class, and elite differences—are indiscriminately stuffed into a nation state sack. Hiding this seeming clutter of qualitative distinctions for the sake of a forced simplicity merely begs the security questions that need answering and relevant theory to confront them.

In light of the values at stake and the global repercussions of the British, French, American, Russian, and Chinese civil wars, it may well be argued that these purported internal wars and not the interstate wars they spawned ought really to be the primary focus of security studies. Civil strife and conflict, arguably, raise more fundamental security problems about the legitimacy of coercion and the role of the state in regulating civil conflict than a state-centric focus. As the society of states moves gradually toward a world society of peoples, the issue of the legitimacy of a particular regime's rule will become increasingly difficult to ignore as a critical security issue (Kothari, 1974; Bull, 1977). The American and French revolutions and now the defunct Soviet experiment urge this question upon the consciousness of peoples and elites everywhere. From an even wider analytic perspective, it may well be argued that, as a global society of peoples and states grope towards a provisional world order, what historians have up to now characterized as interstate wars may well be viewed as a long chain of civil strifes.

Why else are we concerned, as a security issue, whether the ongoing Chinese and Russian revolutions will evolve toward open democratic forms and a market economy or whether they will revert to past forms of

oppressive rule if we are not ultimately concerned that the fate of these titanic struggles hold potentially catastrophic implications for our personal and national security interests not to mention those of the world society and its diverse and divergent populations These concerns similarly underlie the West's and the world's uneasiness about the continued persistence of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq The security issues raised by armed civil strife and by the violent efforts of groups to seize the monopoly power of the state to impose their will are only partially raised by the conflicts inherent in the nation state system as one element of the provisional solution to the global security dilemma and then only in a fashion as Martin Wight suggests that prejudices the analysis in favor of the nation state at the expense of a theory of international relations (Wight 1966)

The essay's strict constructionist interpretation of the scope of security studies narrows access of scholars and practitioners to needed theory to explain what they are studying and why Giants of realist thought, like Hobbes rooted the problem of security in the insatiable and incompatible demands of individuals and groups—what politics is after all—who were prepared to use force or threats to get their way (the security dilemma) Not without significance Hobbes' universal characterization of the security problem arose from the upheaval of the English civil war and not from its later manifestation in the nation state system only just beginning to emerge with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648

In truncating Hobbes' grasp of the security dilemma and the problem of political legitimacy the essay overlooks not surprisingly some of today's outstanding theorists like Robert Axelrod and the new methods they employ in their insistence on posing the problem of security in the most theoretically inclusive terms Sapped too is the timeless force of Axelrod's compelling question Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? (Axelrod 1984: 3) The essay would reduce the search for a solution to the security equation by searching for an unknown value of only one of its elements viz war between states Never asked are the fundamental questions of from whence and whither states not only as provisional solutions to the global security dilemma but also as security problems themselves

Serious conceptual gaps even appear on the level of the essay's preference for third image analysis The assumption is made that most theories about the causes of war are also causes of peace (p 224) Illustrations from the experience of the Cold War and European integration raise doubts about this assumption and its self-fulfilling policy implications Using the modest tools and lean data, relied upon in the survey the security analyst would presumably be forced to conclude that superior military force a favorable balance of power and more adept diplomacy explain why the West won the Cold War George Kennan's prescient argument that the Soviet regime would eventually be forced to mellow if the West relied primarily on its internal strength founded on political freedom and economic productivity to contain Soviet expansionism rather than on threats and military power fall outside the essay's theoretical consideration (Kennan 1947) Thus the explanation of one of the great epic struggles of recorded history is implicitly resolved by the pre-programmed application of realist formulae On the other hand if Kennan's argument is admitted then an explanation for the sources consequences and resolution of the Cold War is left to non-security theorists by default

The statesmen who fashioned the Marshall Plan for Europe and imposed a generous peace on a vanquished Germany and Japan were also acutely aware that an international system relying solely on threats and coercion would repeat the dismal cycle of defiance counter armament, and war unless counterbalancing forces to the nation state struggle could be set in motion (The theoretical basis for this argument is outlined in Boulding 1963 for deterrence theory see Morgan 1983) Many of the architects of the postwar system trusted to the positive incentives of economic growth and to the psychological and political assurances of open institutions to promote peace and security (Baldwin 1985) Security analysts if limited to the guidelines and assumptions of the survey would then be able to make little sense of Marshall's argument that it is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace" (Dennett and Turner 1949) They are placed in the awkward position of dismissing what Marshall has to say as either self-deceiving or disingenuous—he could not have meant what he said and was really animated solely by *macht* considerations to fight the Cold War—or they must assume the uncomfortable position if they concede his point but still wish to remain true to their realist loyalties that his argument might have the force of a theory of peace but not of security

Functionalist (Mitrany 1966) integrationist (Haas 1968) and Gaullist theorizing aimed at resolving Europe's national enmities as well as the resourceful efforts of a half century of European statecraft devoted to surmounting them—no less fall outside the essay's theoretical sites. These efforts to supplant Europe's rivalries through cooperative ventures—common markets, multilateral security organizations, and a shared commitment to democratic institutions—are excluded or marginalized as security phenomena. I.e. from the essay's insular notion of what security analysts should study.

It is just not enough, as the essay commendably allows, to be committed to democratic discourse and to test the proposition whether democracies are peaceful. Security analysis also extends to the search for testable theory about the conditions for creating, preserving, and promoting democracy as a necessary if not sufficient condition for global peace. Thus, for example, not only should Samuel P. Huntington's contributions to security theory, which address civil-military relations and the American domestic political process, be cited—as they are—but also his insightful work in first and second image analysis that explores the determinants of political development and the implications of regime values for creating stable and legitimate national and international orders (Huntington 1968, 1981).

For the security scholar, the theoretical issue centers on answering the question of what, how, and why individuals, groups, and communities get what they want through force, threats, or other coercive means. This specialized concern, limited in scope to foster theory and empirical testing, is an abstraction from the full range of subjective motivations and external factors driving behavior and from their complex interdependencies. The task of theory is not only to disaggregate the phenomenon of violence and politics into components but also to integrate them to ensure that specialized considerations and findings of the security analyst and practitioner are not portrayed as the whole of the phenomena being explained: human behavior. To accomplish this critical integrative function, the security specialist needs help from other scientists and humanists.

To insulate security analysis from other disciplines and their assumptions and testable findings about non-violent human behavior is akin to asking the physicist to confine himself to classical mechanics when he knows quantum mechanics is more suitable. Similarly, if the security analyst must begin with perceived threats of coercion, it does not follow that threats can be distinguished finally from the values that are at risk—what men value and care about. If, in the final analysis, threats are the obverse of values and interests (one has to care before one is threatened), then threats can be understood, as Boulding and others persuasively argue, in ways other than counter-threats and violence as the guarantee of their realization and security (Boulding 1989). Positive sanctions may work to overcome threat perceptions and relax tensions (Baldwin 1979) or rewards and inducements may be alternative ways to foster cooperation or diminish conflict in getting one's way (Milburn and Christie 1989).

From this wider perspective, it would appear problematic in the extreme to equate Grand Strategy to the study of military and diplomatic means (p. 218). What statesmen today would risk office and the discharge of security responsibilities by confining attention and political resources purely to *macht* politics? Lagging economic and techno-scientific development and domestic political oppression, as some Soviet and Chinese leaders have yet to learn, are prescriptions for weakness at home and impotence abroad. Other things also matter if national and international security is to be assured, including economic growth and welfare, international competition, and scientific development. What many cherish most—scientific knowledge—is also the source of our discontents since it is the indispensable condition for the creation of new and more powerful hostile technologies that pose entirely new, unprecedented problems that must be resolved if security planners and citizens are to cope with the potentially self-destructive violence at their disposal. These so-called elements of low politics simply cannot any longer be subordinated to high politics (theorizing about the nation-state and war) without damage to theory building and problem solving (Baldwin 1979, Boulding 1989). The former have an integrity and force as independent variables that are shaping the world society as quite separate from interstate conflict. Indeed, social science is obliged not only to help the soldier and diplomat but to explain their behavior, too. Delegating or denigrating this latter responsibility, as the analysis below suggests, risks the scientific pursuit of security studies itself.

Flaws in Definition Implications for Normative Theory

The shaky analytic pillars on which the essay supports the security studies edifice also reveal a shallow normative foundation on which these pillars rest. The problems posed by the use, threat, and control of organized violence risks being severed from its moral and legal determinants. Except on instrumental grounds—i.e., deciding whether force will work—the issue of the utility of force is isolated from the central question of its legitimate use, threat, or control. The essay's philosophically restrictive notion of the social sciences would confine the security scholar to testing propositions largely specified by the state powerbrokers, policymakers, and managers of violence. The latter decide what is real, relevant, and controllable; the security scholar, using scientific methods and rigorous empirical procedures, is then relegated to the subservient task of assessing the feasibility of policy proposals generated elsewhere. He serves best who evaluates which parcels and passels of organized violence proposed for use by the state and its agents will achieve their stated aims. Social science is transformed into the handmaiden of Grand Strategy. What works pragmatically for using and controlling force—selected scientific tools and an insistence on verifiability—is enlisted in the strategic enterprise, but not so the uncompromising protocols and unfettered sweep of true scientific inquiry.

The contesting claims of rival normative theories of human behavior are no less dismissed in the proclamation of a dubious realism congenial to the rationalization of violence and coercive threats. Once strapped into the normative straightjacket undergirding the essay, the security analyst is exempt from the personal and professional responsibility of questioning the limits of his theory, except to perfect his expectations of state behavior based on realist norms. If he or she examines what the essay characterizes as peace theory, it is to be from the directed perspective of realist theory and practice. Realist security analysts are advised that [g]iven their belief that war is always a possibility, realists should be especially interested in devising ways to ensure that it does not occur. In short, well-informed research on peace is a realistic response to anarchy and should be part of security studies. (p. 225) The assumptions and findings of social and life scientists regarding the conditions and factors prompting human cooperation and conflict can be absorbed into the thinking of the security analyst, but only after the purported impurities of these alternative behavioral paradigms have been filtered out to ensure that realist theory will not be contaminated.

By using so fine a filter to distill pure security studies, the survey, quite logically if misguidedly, identifies the golden age and renaissance of security studies with two different phases of the Cold War. Many of the works cited as seminal are efforts at rationalizing, not always successfully as the Vietnam War suggests, American use of force and threats to win the US-Soviet struggle. Ruled out of order are the critics of the Cold War who charged that the US-Soviet struggle and the bipolarity that it induced was unstable in its tendency to incite and fuel regional conflicts (leading potentially to a global conflagration) and fundamentally illegitimate in arrogating national and global security to the superpowers (De Gaulle, 1970, vol. 5, 104-105; Nehru, 1961).

Time serving is to be conditioned, as the essay admonishes, by the norms of collaborative, diverse, and democratic discourse (p. 231). These are certainly estimable norms, but they are not enough to extricate us from the moral quandary that the essay's circumscribed conception of security studies leads us. In providing a particular philosophical answer to a question yet to be definitively decided, with respect to the moral basis for the use or threat of force, the essay unwittingly frustrates the normative quest to address fully the profound moral dimensions of this problem, prematurely calls closure to the debate over the legitimacy of relying on violence or alternative means to ameliorate or to avoid conflicts, and narrows the exploration of the object to be studied as well as the range of scientific methods and philosophical approaches that might help to relax, if not resolve, the dilemmas that arise when politics and violence are joined.

In raising these objections, let us also be clear about what is not at issue. Certainly most of the works cited merit serious attention. Nor are the scientific method and its application to security problems on trial. More, not less, rigor is advised. Nor is realist moral philosophy on trial. It stands, in principle, as an equal to other moral positions before the bar of scientific inquiry and human experience. It should also be clear that the author is not accused of any personal moral failing. The thrust of the argument here, rather, is to insist that empirical and normative inquiry on security problems be kept open, and not directed unwittingly toward what appears to be a moral *cul de sac*. If the true Renaissance was anything, it was a moral revolution that began to

free the human mind to explore without limit the possibilities of transcending the political constraints force and chance of the social and political institutions to which men are born If Machiavelli wrote the *Prince* the quintessential realist handbook of rule by the few he also explored how the consensual base of governance might be broadened in the *Discourses*

For the sake of brevity and clarity let's deploy Quincy Wright's *Study of War*—surely among the first systematic and rigorous social science efforts to understand and explain war—to make the argument we would like to advance if we had enough time and space Even a casual reading of this magisterial work dispatched in a footnote (p 213) suggests that it is a better guide for scientific discovery interdisciplinary study and moral guidance than the essay's partial view of security studies

Wright defines war as the *legal condition* which *equally* permits two or more *hostile groups* to carry on a *conflict* by *armed force* This suggests that in spite of their hostility they are members of a higher group which originates this law (Wright 1942 89 italics original) Note the breadth of Wright's understanding of war which includes not only a focus on interstate war but much more For Wright war is observable empirically following regular patterns that could be submitted to scientific inquiry *and* to normative exegesis The potentially legitimate agents of armed force may be any group not just the state Moreover first second and third image levels of analysis are comfortably included as parts of the puzzle that the security analyst and practitioner must solve Strategic thinking is squarely centered in the humanistic and social sciences and not consigned to the halls of governments If all groups provisionally stand on a level legal and moral playing field until their rival claims can be examined and evaluated as members of a higher group which originates this law then a moral and legal framework is at least coterminous arguably precedential to the solutions that communities render in their search for a viable security order Wright expects students and practitioners of war to explicate higher laws—behavioral and normative—that can potentially discriminate between the rival claims of contesting groups and the efficacy of their reliance on violence and coercion Wright opens the sack marked war and in sorting out its components discovers for our edification (although written a half century ago) that an explanation of war requires a bigger sack to hold its contents than the survey will allow

What is compelling about Wright's approach to war is that it includes not excludes all forms of human behavior associated with violence in the study of war and, by extension of security that it is both scientific and normative in its claims and that it provides the widest possible berth for human and behavioral disciplines and the hard sciences to participate in understanding and explaining war Inquiry is enlarged not diminished, the search for relevant normative and empirical theories of war and peace is widened not narrowed to the nation state a singular focus that can only act as Martin Wright argues as a prophylaxis to theory (Wright 1966) a broader range of disciplines and knowledge is invoked to solve security problems and the debate is extended not constrained or closed. Yet security studies need not be expanded as Professor Walt prudently counsels to pollution disease child abuse or economic recessions" (p 213) Wright no less than Walt, addresses violence force and coercion in shaping human behavior but his search for their causes consequences and control is conducted on a vaster scale appropriate to the vision and responsibilities of the academy and with greater sensitivity and responsiveness to the breadth and depth of the policy problems that have to be addressed

Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Scope of Security Studies

As the preceding discussion and citations suggest the essay's partial grasp of the analytic normative and methodological dimensions of security studies occasions serious oversights in the survey of the relevant disciplines and works that have advanced the field Ethical moral and legal discourse is barred entry at the frontier of security studies (e.g. Walzer 1977) The contributions of psychology are slighted (e.g. Osgood 1963) as are the important research findings funnelled through the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (e.g. Plous 1987) or the *Journal of Social Issues* (e.g. Levinger 1987)

Economics which is especially important today in explaining the post Cold War world environment is relegated to a secondary role although its disciplinary concerns are increasingly central to national and international security (Intrilligator 1990 Reppy 1989) Curiously there is no reference to *Defence Economics* the key journal in the field The essay's sparse citations of work on the literature of arms production and transfers as modest concessions to the economic dimensions of security suggest that the survey

of the economic literature does not comfortably fit with the essay's bounded definition of security. The implicit mercantilist assumptions underlying the survey inhibit the exploration of alternative explanations like those offered by liberal and Marxist theorists of armed conflict and war (Gulpin 1987).

Similarly, anthropologists and sociologists are expected to take a back seat in the security bus. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, translated into several languages and widely read by military professionals around the globe, is not cited, nor is the principal journal, *Armed Services and Society*, which Janowitz founded while a distinguished professor at the University of Chicago, even noted. (He is cited as a contributor to the golden age, but the uninformed reader is left to guess why.) Game theory loses out, too, because it appears to Walt to be of limited relevance, although that judgment hardly squares with the international interest, in academic and policy circles, in the works of Robert Axelrod (1984) or Steven Brams (1985).

Serious historical and social science works that view security studies in units of centuries and millennia, not just decades, are dismissed as of limited relevance or ignored, although some have won international recognition for originality, as advances in scientific rigor (Singer 1972) and scholarship (Schroeder 1989). History, and the challenge to interpret the meaning of this record of human creation within the evolutionary process, is decomposed into a search for confirming data to support policy proposals or realist assumptions. The historian becomes a hewer of wood and a drawer of water for the security theorist.

As Paul Schroeder's meticulous historical scholarship persuasively shows, the evolution of international society cannot be reduced to realist expectations about the balance of power. The human search for security simply cannot be reconstructed on realist assumptions, as individuals, groups, states, and communities, including the international society today, have pursued more complex strategies and have fashioned more varied social mechanisms to cope with their uncertainty and *angst* over security than the analytic and normative depiction of security conveyed by the survey. States and people, when faced by coercive threats, balance, as realists would expect, but they also bandwagon, hide, and strive, as Hobbes, the *Federalist*, and Axelrod suggest, for cooperative solutions to political conflict, war, and security. Curiously enough, even if one were to adopt the essay's short time horizon for systematic historical analysis, there would still apparently be no place for informed journalism (Halberstram 1973, Sheehan 1988, and Talbott 1985).

No less disconcerting is the amazing ethnocentrism of the survey, alluded to earlier in its omission of European and Third World theorists and in its survey of the Cold War literature. Security studies become *American* security studies. It would require an article at least as long as the survey to explore just some of the important thinking and works of foreign scholars and practitioners who are disregarded (and denigrated) by their absence. Anyone concerned with comparative security studies or with regional conflict—and with the end of the Cold War, the latter are what we will have in abundance—dismisses the thinking and behavior of non-Americans only at the peril of his scholarly credentials and policy relevance. Trees fall even if American security analysts are deaf to the event.

Agenda for the Future: Guidelines

This cursory critique brings us finally to the essay's agenda for the future. Rather than list additional lines of analysis *ad nauseam*, a more fruitful approach might be to identify several guidelines to facilitate the cooperative construction of a research and teaching agenda for the field. First, the security analyst, as scholar, should neither delegate the decision about what is real, relevant, and controllable, nor claim a monopoly over this question. Neither should he expect nor strive for comfortable relations with policymakers, nor conversely should he strain to pick fights to gratify professional or personal conceits. The proper aims should be the promotion of mutual respect and understanding in the discharge of their various and sometimes competing responsibilities and roles. The cultivation of a shared sense of self-limitation would also help the security enterprise and discourage the personalization of policy issues. A wide and wide-ranging net should be constantly cast to test reality. Security and security studies are too important to be left entirely either to scholars or to policymakers—or to both—or to any one survey of the field.

Second, the behavioral and normative assumptions on which research is conducted should be explicitly stated to associate a work with others of a similar kind, in the interests of scientific and normative discovery as

well as to expose hidden deeply embedded valuational biases that might distort or corrupt the objectivity of this creative effort. On this score the essay's unabashed championing of realism deserves praise for rare candor though security studies are likely to be advanced more by multidisciplinary cooperation than by philosophical declamations

Third broaden the disciplinary and interdisciplinary scope of what we mean by security studies rather than risk the field being captured by a clique of like minded cronies as Professor Walt sensibly warns (p 231) Neither scientific inquiry nor human self knowledge is promoted by blind commitment to a singular philosophical view or to group think-canons that substitute assertion for reflection and discerning judgement in deciding what security is what security problems are and how they should be studied and resolved

Fourth broaden the historical and empirical basis for generalization to include not only the Western experience but also that of other cultures Above all do not confine the search for *disconfirming* evidence—the proper scientific test—to a selected number of case studies occurring within a limited time frame and confined almost exclusively to a Western much less to an American frame of reference of purported policy relevance Area study scholars have much to offer on this score especially in the context of regional security studies In a fundamental analytic and philosophical sense anarchy may indeed underlie the human condition but that insight does not get one very far unless the special circumstances and particular historical evolution of regional security systems are closely examined to identify how they work Anarchy and order are not the same thing nor necessarily counterpoised What is important to recognize as Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan suggest, is that anarchy may be ordered in many ways What forms they assume as security systems may perhaps be neither obvious nor logical but still be coherent and compelling in driving behavior (Bull 1977 Buzan 1991)

Fifth let the limits of the problem to be solved determine the scope and parameters of empirical and normative theory rather than impose a particular theory of politics and security that defines what has to be described explained and rationalized The latter approach is tantamount to looking for house keys under a street lamp because the light is better there rather than in the dark of where they were lost Incorporating first, second and third image analysis into theory building helps but these linear planes of analysis should not be confused with the multi dimensional geometric problem of integrating the sphere of politics with that of security We simplify to progress—especially in scientific analysis which demands that we ask questions in ways that can be tested by disconfirming evidence and data In meeting these stringent requirements we are provided with powerful illumination to find our way Nevertheless the limitations of our tools especially in discriminating between competing value claims need also to be recognized

While international relations theorists are acutely aware of the new forces that now bind the world's populations many security theorists and policymakers still flinch from exploring the implications of these revolutionary conditions for the survival of the human species These include the ability to project nuclear weapons anywhere on the globe and the exposure of all particularistic politics—national communal and ideological—to almost instantaneous scrutiny and therefore to doubt and challenge thanks to global communications and transportation In the extreme the emergence of a truly global politics overlaying the legacy of diffuse and decentralized centers of decision that command formidable arrays of organized violence to get their way when their assertions of authority and legitimacy no longer command allegiance urges the perspective of a truly universal and integrated notion of security

To suggest so broad a scope for the problem does not imply that we know what the beast is or what its dimensions are Critical to the task of the security scholar and practitioner is the challenge of defining those dimensions as inclusively as possible Posing the issue this way does not immediately make us Kantians or Grotians or advocates of collective security and world government Our knowledge of the complex ways in which the biological and historical evolutionary processes proceed is insufficient to admit to easy simplification What is clear however is that the security problem is greater than the sum of the parts of first second and third image analysis It potentially encompasses for the first time in history all humans inhabiting the earth It should not be hard for security analysts to follow Clausewitz a little further and posit the notions of pure and real security as helpmates to the concepts of pure and real war As a practical matter and as the Iraq Kuwait crisis (not to mention two world wars and the Cold War) suggests, the security problematic is truly global and

inescapable. Correspondingly, real security regimes—say for Europe or the Middle East—are fundamentally provisional approximations of defining and solving this problem.

Finally, and following from the preceding guidelines, resist the temptation of consigning security studies to a ghetto within the academy. Since pre-historic time, as man emerged from the slime of the sea, getting one's way and using violence to achieve it have been coterminous and causally contingent over human experience. We need all the tools as well as the scientific and interpretive knowledge we can muster to understand and master the ever-powerful instruments of violence at our disposal if we are to persist, prosper, and progress as a species. While there can be no doubt that we have security-problems, it is presumptuous to allege that we have a theory of security. Rather, we have a problem. The survey's blurred vision merges the study of security with its political pursuit; it confounds the question of security with provisional answers for its realization, which crystallize as the structures and assertions of power that we daily observe. On these scores, Wright is right when he appeals to the market place of ideas to explain war and what's real rather than rely primarily on policymakers for answers.

Paradoxically enough, the renaissance in security studies acclaimed in the survey would not have been possible without generous foundation support, which broadened and deepened the interdisciplinary base of the field at many colleges and universities in the United States and abroad. It was now quite proper and indeed urgent to study war, violence, and threats with the same dispassionate care and rigor as molecular biology and child development. The future of that success would be rendered problematic if we relied on the essay's tenuous and tendentious rationalization for the incorporation of security studies within or outside the academy. Security studies can thrive only if they are integrated into the professional concerns and canons of as inclusive a spectrum of disciplinary units as possible within the academy. If we approach security problems in this catholic and questioning spirit, we can do better and more—and have—than this useful but partial survey of security studies admits.

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